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In Mexico we faced a much older industrial relations system than in
either Senegal or Sri Lanka. Mexico had its first major strikes in 1906,
and collective bargainings, (albeit in an embryonic form) were first
conducted in 1912. The industrial relations practices which have grown
up are, therefore, well institutionalized. Thus, we can say that there is a
distinctive Mexican system of industrial relations. But there is also a
good deal of variation within that framework. However, the whole
spectrum of variations and its origins can not, at this stage, be dealt
with; mainly because theanalysis of the data is still incomplete.
I will therefore elaborate on two major aspects - recruitment, and
promotion of manual workers - because they show differences
resulting from one major source of variation - different patterns of
union organization and strength of unions. The firms studied with the
approximate numbers of manual workers employed are given below:
Recruitment
I. Permanent and temporary workers
One basic feature of the work force of the firms included in this study,
and in general of the industrial sector in Mexico, is the co-existence of a
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a state owned railway carriage works 1,100
an American subsidiary car axle makers 400
a Mexican owner-managed textile firm 200
a Japanese-managed Japanese-Mexican joint-venture
electronics firm 600
ajoint-stock textile company with Mexican shareholders 200
a Mexican-managed cement company with a single British
owner of 49 per cent of capital 150
a brewery subsidiary of a large Mexican corporation 600
a steel-mill owned by the same corporation 1,000
permanent work force which has a very low turnover, with a constantly
present but varying number of temporary workers with a high turnover.
Temporary workers are in general hired for short periods with no
guarantee that the contract will be renewed, and most frequently
perform unskilled jobs. In one or two firms, however (where the
product market fluctuates more widely) a large number of temporary
workers is employed at all times; they are hired for longer periods of
employment and for more skilled jobs - the length of the contract
justifies the learning of new skills. Although temporary work is always
considered as a first step towards obtaining permanent employment the
waiting period in the firms studied varies between two and six years,
and though the law establishes that temporary workers should be given
preference when permanent vacancies occur, temporary workers can
rarely exercise this right if the permanent force is not increasing,
because of the low turnover of permanent workers.
The majority of temporary workers of the firms studied tend to remain
loyal to the firm for which they are working; that is, they do not search
for jobs in other firms when they are idle because the more contracts a
temporary worker has worked in a firm the more chances he will have
of getting a permanent job.
The situation of permanent workers is quite different. The main
characteristic of this section of the labour force is stability and security
of employment. It is exceptionally rare for a worker to change his
employment once he has obtained permanent status, though workers
with general skills of a high level are slightly more inclined to be
mobile. Whether recruited from temporary workers or otherwise,
permanent workers are usually hired initially to fill the lowest grades of
the promotion ladder (which, as we shall see, exists in all firms) and as
vacancies occur up the ladder and/or the permanent work-force
expands promotions to superior grades are granted. Quite apart from
voluntary quits, permanent workers are strongly protected by the law
and the unions against dismissal. Thus, turnover rates for permanent
workers are exceptionally low (never higher than 7 per cent).
II. Channels of recruitment and criteria
It is in the Collective Agreements between the union and management
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(hereafter CA) that conditions and requisites of entry are specifically
set out, the detail in which the matter is dealt with being highly
correlated with the status and power of the union vis-ej-vis the firm. The
section on recruitment of a typical CA may read as follows:
union membership as an indispensable condition for permanent and
temporary workers to be hired;
establishment of the union as the sole supplier of labour, and period
of time the union has to supply candidates to fill vacancies;
minimum age to enter employment (in most cases 16);
need for Certificate of Primary Education;
need for Health Certificate;
need for proof of the ability to perform the job.
The above clauses are not as a matter of principle always included in all
CA, and even when they exist the extent to which recruitment is
strictly carried out as set out in the CA also varies. However,
irrespective of the different degrees of importance given to the above
requisites, two generalizations can be made at this point: all firms laid
particular emphasis on: (a) age; young workers (not more than in their
late twenties) were preferred - those with enough working life left to
justify the large retirement bonus; (b) education.
These regulations are designed to cover both bottom-of-the.ladder
recruitment - the predominant form - and the (much rarer)
recruitment of skilled workers who are slotted into higher points in the
promotion ladder. It is in the case of the latter that 'proof of ability' is
most important and there is a wide variety in the means of regulating
such proof. Frequently, too, there are provisions giving the union a
longer grace period to supply candidates for this type of vacancy,
though in effect (in the axle and electronics firm and in one limited
case, in the carriage works) it is usually the firm rather than the union
which actually finds candidates and the unions which subsequently give
them membership, for there is a genuine shortage in Mexico of these
highly skilled electronicians and mechanics, draughtsmen, toolmakers
and turners.
But the main variation concerns the effective role of the union. The
first clause (the union shop clause) is found wherever there is a CA, but
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there is considerable variation in the extent to which unions actually
control recruitment both de facto and de jure; also in the ways in which
they exereise such controls as they have. I shall attempt to indicate the
spectrum of variations.
A. Right to supply labour by the union is established in the CA and the
union fully exercises its right
This is the case in the carriage works, the two textile companies and the
cement firm. The procedure in all these cases is for the firm to send a
written request to the union for the amount and kind of workers
needed. The union has a short and pre-established period to supply the
workers needed by the firm, which the union in general does with no
problem at all. Since the jobs to be filled by new entrants are almost
always unskilled, there is no point in the firm questioning the
suitability of any candidate to perform an unskilled job. Once the
candidate proves he has the necessary requirements of health and
education, the process of hiring is complete.
As can be seen, the firm is quite passive all along the process. On
occasions the union has presented candidates in their late thirties and
the firm has been forced to hire them despite a clear policy of
preferring younger workers. It also shows the secondary ranking that
personnel selection has in the eyes of these firms. This lack of screening
of the candidate has particular importance if the permanent nature of
the commitment of workers is taken into consideration, and the fact
that it is from this starting pool of unskilled labour that the firm will
obtain its skilled workers through a gradual process of promotion and
on the job training.
How did the unions acquire such rights? From the union side the
strength of union members' desire to be able to nominate their sons and
cousins is easily explained by unemployment and the preciousness of
permanent employment in the modern sector. But why some firms
should have conceded this right rather than others is harder to say.
What can be said is that (contrary to some of the hypotheses from
which the research started) personnel selection has a secondary
importance in the eyes of managers. I asked one personnel manager
who showed some concern about this, if it was not possible for the firm
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to get the union to send more than one candidate for each post. 'The
problem is that if it is the firm which puts the idea on the bargaining
table in the CA revision, the union will ask for something in exchange,
and a change in the recruitment process is not precisely one of our
priorities - not enough to make us pay a price for it'. Which is not,
however, to say that managers are entirely unconcerned, and the raising
of educational qualifications has been one means they have adopted in
an attempt to protect the quality of the work force. In several firms the
requirement of primary school graduation had been introduced in the
last ten years; others had introduced the criterion of literacy.
B. Recruitment in the hands of the union but firms control the hiring
process
This is the case in the axles and electronics firms. These two firms share
certain common features, which are particularly relevant for their hiring
policies; specifically, both firms are relatively new and have a
continuously expanding permanent labour force, and in both cases
members' control of the unions is weak; the union is dominated by
outside professional 'leaders'. In these firms the prerogative of
supplying labour is established in their respective CA in the same terms
as in the CA of the firms of the previous group, but not all candidates
sent by the union are hired - it is not only that some candidates are
rejected but also that some of the workers actually hired are not union
candidates. This applies not only to the hiring of temporary workers
but also to the final admission of permanent workers which is in fact
controlled by the firms through previous screening of all candidates by
skill tests (in one case) or so-called probationary periods.'
Clearly the co-opted nature of the unions in these firms - the fact that
they are less under the control of their members than of 'bosses'
prepared to accommodate to managers' wishes - is one precondition
for these arrangements. However, the firms' motives to intervene so
actively in the hiring of their personnel, as rationalized by their
respective personnel managers, are somewhat different. In the case of
The labour law forbids the signing of probationary contracts. The firm uses the
round-about method of hiring workers for a fixed term contract of 28 days which is
later transformed into an 'indefinite length contract'.
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the (Japanese-owned) electronics firms, 'Most jobs in our firm require a
manual ability that cannot be developed unless the worker possesses a
minimum inborn dexterity'. In the case of the axles firm the answer
was a straightforward one in terms of 'managerial prerogative' and the
power balance. 'We consider the recruitment of personnel something
that belongs to the firm and not to the union'.
C. Recruitment totally controlled by the firm
This group is made up of the steel-mill and brewery; both are parts of
one of the few firms in Mexico in which unions do not have the right to
supply labour. Furthermore, their CA also lacks mention of the other
requisites for admission (education, age, etc.,) which generally are
included in most CA in order that any changes in them should be
subject to previous bargaining with the union. The only thing in this
respect which they have in common with other firms is that workers
must be accepted by the union before they can work in the firms at all.
This in theory gives the union a power to veto any new worker, but in
fact it is never used.
This difference in the institutional aspects of recruitment of this group
of firms reflects two of the nany features which make this group so
clearly different from all the other firms studied: first, the group's
concern with the quality of its labour force, and secondly the fact that
the union, in these firms, though not controlled by outside bosses and
apparently incorrupt, adopts a generally co-operative attitude to
management, accepting as management prerogative a range of matters
which unions in other firms seek to control.
The group's concern with the quality of the labour force shows itself in
its systematic bureaucratized recruitment process in which education, a
'career philosophy', and what we might call an 'institutionalization of
the personal contact' form the three basic pillars in the selection of
candidates.
The stress on education ('the more the better') is nothing exceptional.
However, what is important about these firms is that the reasons for
using education as a screening device and the assumptions behind it
have been worked out and neatly rationalized. Thus, the answer given
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by the Industrial Relations manager to the question: 'Is it not a waste
to employ somebody with secondary education to sweep the floor?'
was straightforward and came in a ready-made package wrapped with
'company philosophy'.
'In fact it is the opposite. Our policy is to recruit people into the
lower levels so that later they can progress upwards. If a worker has
not got sufficient education he will not be able to go up and this
causes frustration. We feel that for the worker to have confidence in
the company and identify himself with it, he must have career
prospects. Despite what is said elsewhere, we think the Mexican first
and foremost wants security. This self-actualization policy comes
from the philosophy of the group which is that the profits of the
group are the means to achieve the development of all the individuals
who work in it'.
What we call the 'institutionalization of the personal contact' refers to
the fact that candidates to be hired require three references from
persons already working in the 'group'. Our suggestion that the latter is
a potential source of favo.uritism was firmly rejected by all the
managers with whom this matter was discussed. What they did, instead,
was to praise what they considered the positive side of it: the
responsibility that referees are expected to assume for the behaviour of
the persons he has recommended. In fact, if there is any problem with a
new employee one of his referees is told to talk to him and 'put him on
the right road again'. However, there is a rule which forbids relations to
work in the same department.
Promotion
I. The structure of promotion ladders
All jobs in Mexican factories are arranged into promotion ladders in one
of two ways - either in a number of promotion chains in which each
step is a specific job - furnace operator, first class welder, second class
welder, etc. - or all the jobs in a factory are grouped into a definitive
number of categories, with, say, category 4 including such diverse jobs
as assistant electricians, painters, production operative first class, etc.
The former system was found in the cement, carriage works, textile,
steel-mill and brewery firms; the latter in the others: axles and
electronics. Where the former system is used the various promotion
chains may be based on any of the following:
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a department in the functional organization of the firm, to be
distinguished from the next though in many cases both coincide;
an interrelated set of productive activities;
a related skill.
In most cases, simplicity of operation and organization were the reasons
given for having a single all-factory promotion ladder. However, an
additional factor to be considered is clearly the technology, the
production system used and the heterogeneity of skill requirements. In
other words, where technology imposes a functional and clearly
separate departmental organization where common skills are used, a
promotion system composed of different promotion chains naturally
develops. The important thing about this system is that there is a kind
of continuity between the levels of each promotion ladder, either
because all levels in the ladder require the same kind of skills but with
increasing degrees of sophistication or, when skills are rather different,
a standing-by.Nelly process provides the training links between the
different levels. In the single promotion-ladder system, on the contrary,
a considerable degree of discontinuity between levels or at some point
in the ladder was the norm. For the purpose of illustration I will
describe the promotion ladders of the carriage-works and cement firms.
The former firm has 18 different promotion ladders, each ladder with,
in most cases, six levels. In general the different ladders grouped
workers with the same kind of skill or job, so that there was a ladder
for the foundry workers, another for welders, another for workers in
the assembly line etc. There were cases, however, where workers with
different skills were also on the same ladder because they were in the
same department. An extreme case of this kind was the promotion
ladder for panel-beaters; to climb a step up the ladder required such
different skills that it was very difficult for them to be promoted. In
fact, none of them has been able to rise to the next level, though many
of them have the necessary seniority to do so. However, while I was in
this firm management had promised to establish a new
separate-promotion ladder for panel-beaters. A final striking feature of
this firm's promotion system was that all equal levels in different
promotion ladders, e.g. top level painters and tool-makers, earn the
same wage, though a glaring difference in the skills and knowledge
required by the highly skilled tool-makers and the painters, whose job
was much less demanding, was not consistent with their equal wages.
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This becomes even more marked if the shortage of toolmakers in the
labour market is taken into consideration, a shortage which in turn is
truly reflected in the high market wage for tool-makers. The only
obvious rationale appeared to be to provide equal chances of
advancement to workers in every department.
By contrast, the most significant feature of the promotion ladder in the
cement firm was the marked discontinuity between almost all the levels
of the ladder. The discontinuity is intrinsic to the technology used to
obtain cement: the job of a kiln operative is different from the job of a
crush operator and both in turn perform different jobs from the one
performed by a laboratory assistant. Added to this is the isolation in
which these jobs are performed, which further precudes any learning
while working in another job. It is precisely the absence of a clear skill
linkage between the different levels that makes this firm's promotion
ladder the best prototype of a ladder set up, above more than anything
else, to provide a career rather than to facilitate the process of training.
While it is true that insiders, because of the general knowledge they
have, may still be 'rationally' preferred over outsiders, the fact is that
the norms regulating promotion reflected this discontinuity: paid
training periods outside working hours were established to facilitate
promotions to higher levels - the same training periods as would have
been necessary to allow an outsider to learn the job.
The implications of the above description are quite indicative of the
basic concerns the promotion structure incorporates in situations
where, as in these firms, the union is fairly strong. In this sense, it
represents a polar case of a spectrum which, ceteris paribus, gradually
moves away from this promotion structure as the balance of power is
tilted towards the side of management. The first of these concerns is to
provide a 'career' for all workers. Hence, the job organization must link
the different jobs in one way or another, even though, as in the case of
the panel-beaters, the linkage is somewhat artificial. On the part of
workers this concern for a career can be seen mainly as the result of the
prevailing shortage of jobs elsewhere in the economy. Thus, workers
tend to hold on to their jobs and consequently the only way to better
themselves is by progressing within the firm. The second concern is
with equality: everybody should have the same career options, which in
the case of the carriage-works means having the same number of levels
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in each of the different promotion chains; and for complete equality,
equal wages should be paid for the same levels. The latter equality,
however, like the regulative device in granting promotions is probably
more the consequence of the unrestricted entrenchment of seniority. In
such a case, the common denominator between ladders becomes
seniority (the very factor which promotion seems to reward most); skill
differentials, as those existing between the painting and tool-making
shop, are not taken into account when wages are set.
What remains to be analysed to complete the description of the
structure of the promotion ladders is the degree to which the functions
and tasks corresponding to each level or job in the ladder are
established; in other words, to what extent the content of jobs is fixed
and delimited. The importance of this aspect of the promotion ladder
lies in the following two facts: first, this is the structural feature of the
ladder which conditions most of the everyday allocation of labour
within the firms. Here the question is not only whether a mechanic is
justified in refusing to sweep his work-place but more importantly who
is the welder or mechanic among the four categories of welders and
mechanics who is entitled to accept or refuse a work-assignment - a
compounded problem if overtime is involved. These were the kind of
limitations that the principle of closely defined job descriptions, when
it was really observed, imposed upon man4gement. Second, it is only
when the tasks that ajob incumbent must perform are defined and
delimited, that the principle of equal pay for equal work - a principle
enshrined in the Mexican labour law - can be meaningful and operate
effectively.
Only one of our firms, the Japanese-managed electronics firm, had
overtly departed from this principle by promoting workers to
higher-wage categories after the passing of promotion tests, irrespective
of the jobs they were actually doing at the time. In other firms there
were covert moves towards such a 'person-related' wage system through
the ad hoc raising of the category of ajob for no other reason than that
the person had been doing it for a long time and was felt to 'deserve', a
promotion. But generally, the fixed-job-description and
equal-pay- for- equal-work principles severely constrict management's
ability to give discretionary promotions according to personal
characteristics.
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Probably the mere fact that the equal pay principle is institutionalized
explains why it formed part of the frame of reference of both workers
and managers. However, for management it acted mainly as a constraint
in the allocation of labour. If the organization of jobs is such that the
tasks corresponding to each category are delimited, the principle
implies that any departure from the specified assignments should also
entail differential payment in wages. The consequences of this are not
only additional and cumbersome financial and administrative
arrangements but also, as long as the worker is entitled to refuse an
assignment, a restriction on management authority. The workers, for
their part, were concerned to avoid 'deterioration of status' when there
were minor or dirty additional tasks to be done, and to make sure that
they could gain in pay when there were temporary absences to be filled
in higher categories, or they were asked to do overtime on higher
category tasks.
From a more general point of view workers were also concerned with
restricting management authority. Since one of the most abundant and
common exercises of managerial authority is to order tasks outside the
customary or established assignments associated with a job, workers felt
that by having the tasks corresponding to each job clearly delimited,
managerial authority as such was also restricted. Thus, with the single
exception of the electronics firm, the structure of the job organization
was always designed on the basis that a specific set of tasks was alloted
to each category or job. In other words, even when management was
allowed to depart from the customary assignment of tasks with a
certain degree of freedom, this was based on an unrestrained use of
authority to bend the system and not on a structure of job organization
designed, as in the electronics firm, to allow flexibility in the use of
labour.
The full operation of the above job delimitation is enforced by the
norms in the CA, which on the one hand establishes that under no
circumstances will managers or supervisors order any worker to perform
tasks that do not correspond to his category, and on the other oblige
the firm to fill temporary absences with temporary promotions which
in turn mean a temporary rise in wage. At the same time the
delimitation of jobs also provides a general basis for the allocation of
overtime; thus, even in the few remaining unregulated areas the system
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on the whole facilitates a substantial degree of workers' control over
the allocation of labour.
The extent to which this control extends was illustrated in the
maintenance department of the carriage works. Maintenance work, in
the nature of the case, defies easy classification. The practice had
developed that the supervisor in this department consulted with the
higher category workers to decide what skill level a particular task
required - i.e. which category of worker should do it. Consultation was
especially necessary for overtime.
II. Criteria or principles regulating promotion
The Mexican Federal Labour Law, Article 159, has this to say about
seniority promotion rights:
'When a vacancy occurs, either permanent or for a duration greater than
thirty days, or when a new post is created, it shall be filled by the
worker with the highest seniority in the next lower category of the
relevant profession or trade. If there are two or more workers with the
same seniority in competition for the post, it shall go to the more able.
If the employer fulfils the obligations laid down in Article 132, Section
VI (concerning the employers' duty to provide training facilities) the
worker with a claim to the post shall be required to demonstrate that
he possesses the knowledge and skill required to fill it'.
Although the law is unequivocal in establishing seniority as the
regulating principle for promotion, in practice other elements always
enter into the actual functioning of promotion systems. The collective
agreements, by and large, faithfully mirror the spirit of the law; the two
relevant principles are seniority and competence, and the various
practices in different firms involve different weightings of these two
factors and different operational interpretations of the concept of
'competence'. It will therefore be convenient to order the analysis of
the different promotion systems around this dichotomy.
In the carriage works, textiles and cement, promotion follows the legal
prescription, though not strictu senso in one respect. Whereas the law
makes the need to give proof of knowledge' conditional on the
employer providing opportunities for training, all the collective
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agreements stipulate the need for demonstrating competence whether
courses are provided or not. However, as we shall see, this obligation
has no great practical consequences.
In the three firms named, the worker with the highest seniority can
claim priority in filling vacancies. In the carriage works and the cement
firms promotion requires a theory test and a probationary period of 25
and 30 days respectively; while in the textile firm the worker has only
to pass successfully through 15 days' probation. If the most senior
worker falls the test or the probation, the next senior worker becomes
eligible and so on down the line. Once again, as with recruitment, the
employer's ability to influence the selection of candidates is minimal. It
is not surprising that workers should seek to achieve this. We have
already seen how, in a labour-surplus situation, the principal aspiration
of the worker centres on his security and his possibilities of a career
within the enterprise; the acceptance of the seniority principle gives the
best assurance of fulfilling these aspirations automatically and without
favour of the employer.
But the point to stress is how well, in these firms, they have succeeded
- to the point that the actual functioning of the system tends to
legitimate the idea that seniority alone guarantees promotion. In the
first place, the way in which seniority is treated in the collective
agreement reinforces the importance granted to it. The rights of
seniority, declaims the carriage works agreement, 'and of promotion by
seniority, are the exclusive property of thç workers and as such are
absolutely inviolable vis-à-vis the enterprise, the union or the workers
themselves'. Such is the mystique of seniority, that inefficient workers
have been said to go along cheerfully to the (written) tests for
promotion, confident that their seniority gave them the 'right' to
promotion. Secondly, the bureaucratic regulation surrounding
promotion clearly restricts the ability of managers to influence the
outcome; what is more, given the time-consuming nature of the
procedures for settling disputes, it is often more convenient for
managers to arrive at a private agreement with union leaders than to
stick to the letter of the rules' insistence on competence. Hence, when a
candidate fails his test or his probationary period, union leaders argue,
and often with success, that his seniority merits his being given a second
chance - or that he simply be given the promotion anyway. The firm in
any case is often in no legal position to take a hard line since it does n.ot
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have the training courses which the law requires as a condition for
insisting on tests of competence.
The extent to which the job structure and the seniority system
combined limit the managers' control over the allocation of labour was
graphically shown in some instances of promotion to cover temporary
absences in the carriage works. Sometimes the worker next in line of
seniority was not in reality competent to do the higher category job but
in recognition of his right (tests are not required for temporary
promotion) he would be given the pay of the higher post while some
more able worker further down the seniority line was actually sent to
do the job - and he also, of course, was paid at the higher rate.
In marked contrast with the former groups, the order of priorities is
reversed in the other enterprises; the axle firm, the steel firm, the
brewery and the electronics firm. That is to say, promotion was not
given to the most senior worker once he had shown himself
incompetent; rather it was given to the most 'competent' worker, with
seniority relegated to a secondary place or ignored altogether. However,
'competent' is not entirely accurate: in the law competence is defined
in terms of knowledge and skills necessary to do a job. In these firms,
however, it was a rag-bag concept incorporating a variety of 'knowledge
or other requirements' determined to serve the purposes of the
enterprise, which was able to dominate and utilize the whole
promotion system. Managers' control over the system is ensured first by
the absence in the Collective Agreement of any guarantee of the union's
right to share in the establishment of the criteria for promotion or in
the taking of promotion decisions - a reflection of the greater
weakness of the unions in these as compared with the last groups of
establishment. Secondly, the fact that, in the electronics and axles firms
at best, there was no clear functional relation between the job category
and the work it required, permitted the granting of promotions with
greater flexibility - and entirely at the discretion of the managers.
Thus, whereas in the other firms, promotion, almost guaranteed by
seniority, had become in Herzberg's terms a hygienic factor -
something that caused resentment if for any reason it was denied - in
the latter firms it played a motivational role, a genuine carrot.
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A particular aspect of the above account must be emphasized. The
crucial role of the unions in determining the differences between the
firms studied has been consistent through all the other aspects of the
research I have dealt with so far. This is important because it shows that
some of the features which the Late Development hypothesis attributes
to managers' initiative should be ascribed to union strength.
What is the source of this strength? The political role the unions play in
the Mexican system can undoubtedly take us a long way in trying to
answer this question. A typical activity under this role includes
supporting the government against conservative industrialists. However,
sometimes in their trade.union role, the unions verbally oppose the
government, even adopting 'fight-to-the-last-ditch' rhetoric, i.e.
threatening general strikes. In fact, no general strike, nor, for that
matter, any major strike with serious implications for the economy, has
taken place in the last fifteen years. Yet, the union warnings are taken
very seriously by all the parties concerned. Given this ambiguity, that
previous analyses of the unions leave one with a sense that something is
missing should not be surprising. Yet a more comprehensive and
historical account of the unions, in their industrial as well as their
political role is essential for a better understanding of the Mexican
industrial relations system.
A further stage of the analysis will be to establish what are the values of
the above findings for policy. For example, given that turnover of
permanent workers is fairly low, how relevant are the policy
recommendations which implicitly attach a positive value to the
'proper' functioning of the labour market (especially the stress on
mobility as the means of optimizing the allocation of labour). How
relevant is it to talk about rigidities as a form of deviant anomaly, when
those rigidities are, at least for some time, here to stay? What are the
implications of the balkanization of one section of the labour market
for employment generation policies? Given the active role of the unions
in the recruitment process, can we afford to have reports on
employment generation and practices which just do not mention them?
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